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Abstract: 
There is no disagreement in the literature on the persistence of China’s authoritarian regime. People 
differ on the way of explaining the phenomenon. Obviously, the issue is of profound importance in 
political science and law. In the literature, many scholars pursue a single variable approach, examining 
the issue from the perspective of resilience, regime inclusion, timing and sequence of using FDI, or 
national identity. The author argues that any single variable explanation is inadequate despite the 
coherence or elegance of such theories. Among those who have adopted the multivariable perspective 
in examining the phenomenon of China’s persistence of authoritarianism, people tend to ignore some 
of the variables such as modernization, the cultural variable, the geo-political factor, and legitimacy in 
their analyses. This article has approached the issue by focusing on these four variables to explain 
China’s persistence of authoritarianism. 
Keywords: Authoritarianism, Modernization, Cultural Explanation, Geo-Political Factor, Legitimacy. 
1 Introduction 
There is no disagreement in the literature on the persistence of China’s authoritarian regime. People 
differ on the way of explaining the phenomenon. Gallagher argues that the timing and sequencing of 
foreign direct investment (FDI) liberalization in China is a key factor of explaining delayed 
democratization.
1
 She states that, “FDI liberalization preceded both the privatization of state industry 
and the development of a domestic private sector,” providing the Chinese government “more time and 
more political space to pursue economic reform without political liberalization.”2 Gallagher’s 
argument, however, may also point to the other direction that FDI brings into China western liberal 
ideas and the superiority of western political systems, together with Western technology and 
management methods. If that is the case, China should have introduced political reform at an earlier 
stage. In addition, her argument is not able to explain the remarkably high level of popular support for 
the authoritarian regime even at the beginning of this century.
3
 Yan Xiaojun tries to explain the 
                                                             
1
  Mary Gallagher, “Reform and Openness: Why China’s Economic Reforms Have Delayed Democracy”, 54 World Politics 
338-72 (2002). 
2
  Ibid., p. 339. 
3
  Teresa Wright, Accepting Authoritarianism: State-Society Relations in China’s Reform Era (Stanford, California: 
Stanford University Press, 2010), pp. 13-14, 17. 
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resilience of China’s authoritarianism from the perspective of regime inclusion.4  He holds the view 
that the local people’s political consultative conference plays the role of “assisting the ruling party-state 
to build, consolidate and retain political support and to prolong the longevity of the system.”5 Regime 
inclusion, however, requires that people have confidence in the regime. Whether people have 
confidence in the regime must be explained by other factors such as economic performance or 
preference for a particular type of regime. Besides, regime inclusion depends, to some extent, upon the 
legitimacy of the regime. Tsai uses the informal institution of solidary group to show that public goods 
can be supplied even when “formal institutions of bureaucratic and democratic accountability do not 
seem to have a major impact on village governmental performance and public goods provision.”6 Her 
explanation is that “social groups that are encompassing, embedding, and solidary can also make 
citizens more likely and able to use moral standing to reward officials for providing public goods.”7 
While her book provides a sound explanation for the provision of public goods at the village level, the 
theory is not useful in explaining regime persistence or change. This is so because informal institutions 
work well only in small communities where people know each other well and are less mobile. 
According to Huntington, however, modern democracy is the democracy of the nation-state.
8
  That 
explanation also reveals why village democracy in China does not have much impact upon regime 
change of the nation despite optimistic views on village committee election.
9
 He Baogang explains the 
delay of democracy in China in terms of national identity.
10
 According to He, democratization will lead 
to the separation or independence of Tibet or Taiwan. This explanation is true only if democracy in the 
sense of electing the provincial leaders is adopted far head of electing the national leaders. If 
democracy in China is firstly implemented at the national level, it is not necessarily true that a 
democratically elected central government will tolerate the separation or independence of Tibet or 
Taiwan. He fails to treat this sequence issue. 
While the above authors examine a particular aspect of regime persistence or the provision of public 
goods, Wright uses several factors to show acceptance of authoritarianism by various types of people in 
China.
11
   “[T]he political attitudes and behavior of the Chinese public derive from the interaction of 
                                                             
4
  Yan Xiaojun, “Regime Inclusion and the Resilience of Authoritarianism: The Local People’s Political Consultative 
Conference in Post-Mao Chinese Politics, 66 The China Journal 53-75 (2011). 
5
 Ibid., p. 75. 
6
  Lily L. Tsai, Accountability without Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 12. 
7
  Ibid., p. 93. 
8
  Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (New Delhi: Adarsh Books, 
1991), p. 13. 
9
  Tianjian Shi, “Village Committee Elections in China: Institutionalist Tactics for Democracy”, 51 World Politics 385- 412 
(1999). 
10
 He Baogang, “Why Is Establishing Democracy So Difficult in China?”, 35 Contemporary Chinese Thought 71- 92 
(2003). 
11
  Wright, supra note 3. 
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three key factors” including “state-led economic development policies, market forces related to late 
industrialization, and socialist legacies.”12  As single variable explanation is more likely to be 
problematic, Wright is moving in the right direction. Her research, however, ignores factors such as 
geo-political variable and cultural variable. Hu uses historical legacies, local forces, the world system, 
socialist values and economic development to analyze China’s difficulty with democratization.13 
Except for the factor of economic development, Hu focuses on pre-1949 or pre-1978 China rather than 
current China after 1978. This article uses a multivariable perspective to visit two frequently discussed 
factors explaining democratization. These factors are the modernization theory and the cultural 
explanation. In addition to these two explanations, the article also examines the geo-political factor and 
the resilience factor in explaining the persistence of China’s authoritarianism. Section I begins with the 
modernization theory. Section II focuses on the cultural explanation. Section III analyzes the geo-
political factor. Section IV examines resilience or legitimacy. Section V reviews available survey 
results. Conclusion follows in Section VI.   
2 Modernization 
Lipset first raised the correlation between economic development and democracy.
14
 Specifically, his 
research supported the conclusion that “the average wealth, degree of industrialization and 
urbanization, and level of education is much higher for the more democratic countries.”15 In other 
words, the higher the rate of economic development the greater the propability for a country to become 
democratic. Huntington is a strong support of the modernization theory. According to Huntington, 
when a country moves up the economic ladder, the greater are the chances that it will be democratic.
16
 
Both Lipset and Huntington emphasize the importance of broad-based economic development. 
Huntington offers two major explanations why broad-based economic development is conducive to 
democratization: 
Economic development created new sources of wealth and power outside the state and a functional 
need to develop decision making. More directly, economic development appears to have promoted 
changes in social structure and values that, in turn, encouraged democratization.
17
 
Neither Lipset nor Huntington, however, considers economic development a sufficient condition for 
democratization. Lipset considers broad-based economic development a basic condition sustaining 
                                                             
12
  Ibid., p. 2. 
13
  Shaohua Hu, Explaining Chinese Democratization (Westport: Praeger, 2000). 
14
 Seymour Martin Lipset, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy”, 53 
The American Political Science Review 69-105 (1959). 
15
 Ibid., p. 75. 
16
  Samuel Huntington, “Will More Countries Become Democratic?”, 99 Political Science Quarterly, 193-218 (1984), p. 
198-99. 
17  Huntington, Third Wave, supra note 8, p.65. 
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democracy,
18
  but not necessarily a factor led to democracy.
19
 Similarly, Huntington remarks that “no 
level or pattern of economic development is in itself either necessary or sufficient to bring about 
democratization.”20 The statistical analysis of Przeworski and Limongi supports such a cautious 
conclusion. According to Przeworski and Limongi, “once established, democracies are likely to die in 
poor countries and certain to survive in wealthy ones.”21 Hence, narrowly focused factor on income 
does not reveal significant impact on democratization. The study of Acemoglu et al. reveals that “there 
is no relationship between changes in income and democracy” over the last 100 years, but there is a 
correlation between income and democracy over the past 500 years.
22
 While they did not entirely reject 
the possible impact of income on democracy, their preferred explanation is that societies might embark 
on divergent development paths in the past, leading to different political regimes.
23
 Recognizing the 
impact of income on democracy, Londregan and Poole concluded that “the estimated magnitude of the 
democracy-promoting impact of income is not large.”24 
This review of the modernization theory shows that the case of China is quite consistent with the 
literature. I will provide statistical evidence related to changes in income, industrialization, education, 
and urbanization in China to better demonstrate the consistence.  
During the last 30 years, the annual growth rate of gross domestic product (GDP) in China was around 
9 per cent. Unlike economic development in resource rich economies, the development of the Chinese 
economy has been broad-based. GDP per capita developed from 463 yuan in 1980 to 1644 yuan in 
1990, 7858 yuan in 2000 and 29748 yuan in 2010.
25
 Converted into US dollars, the GDP per capita in 
China reached USD 1,000 in 2003, surpassed USD 2,000 in 2007 and USD 3,000 in 2008. In 2010, the 
per capita GDP exceeded USD 4,000. This means that between 2003 and 2008, China was within the 
middle income range of USD 1,000 to 3,000,
26
 which Huntington predicted that “transitions to 
democracy should occur primarily in countries at the middle level of economic development.”27  
                                                             
18
 Lipset, supra note 14, p. 86. 
19
  Ibid., p. 103. 
20
 Huntington, Third Wave, supra note 8, p. 59. 
21
  A. Przeworski and F. Limongi, “Modernization: Theories and Facts”, 49 World Politics 155- 183 (1997), p. 167. 
22
 Daron Acemoglu et al., “Income and Democracy”, 98 American Economic Review 808-42 (2008), p. 812. 
23
  Ibid., p. 812. 
24
  John B. Londregan and Keith T. Poole, “Does High Income Promote Democracy?”, 49 World Politics 1-30 (1996), pp. 
2-3. 
25
  Data comes from various years of the Statistical Yearbook of China (Beijing: Statistical Yearbook Press). 
26
  Huntington, Third Wave, supra note 8, p. 63. 
27
  Ibid., p. 60. 
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China’s urbanization rate also rose significantly.  In 1980, the urbanization rate was only 19.39 per 
cent.
28
 This rate increased to 26.41 per cent in 1990, 36.22 per cent in 2000 and 49.68 per cent in 
2010.
29
 Closely related to the increase of urbanization rate, the number of persons employed in urban 
areas almost tripled from 1980 to 2010. In 1980, there were 104.44 million persons employed in urban 
areas. Thereafter, the number of persons employed in urban areas rose to 202.07 million in 1997 and 
346.87 million in 2010.
30
  
Among the various indicators, education was considered much more important to democracy than per 
capita GDP, urbanization, and industrialization.
31
 This is likely so as education increases the capacity 
of people in their public participation or deliberation of policy making. From this perspective, 
university education is critical in terms of deliberation of public policies. Evidence shows that 
economic development in China has considerably improved people’s capability of receiving an 
university education. This can be seen from the number of university students per 100,000 inhabitants. 
While this figure was 116 in 1980, it rose to 180 in 1990, 493 in 2000 and 3,105 in 2010.
32
 
The above statistical evidence does not reveal any significant impact of improvement in income, 
industrialization, urbanization, and education upon democratization in China. So far, China remains an 
authoritarian political regime. To the contrary, the case of China may prove that modernization and 
democratization are different things as pointed out by Huntington.
33
 Specifically, Huntington quotes 
Pipe with approval that “modernization requires no one political ideology or set of institutions: 
elections, national boundaries, civic associations, and the other hallmarks of Western life are not 
necessary to economic growth.”34 This appears to be consistent with the literature on law and 
development that economic development requires clear definition and enforcement of property rights
35
 
and the facilitation of contractual exchange and the enforcement of contracts by a formal legal 
system.
36
 Law and development in China seems to be consistent with the view that a formal legal 
system defining and enforcing property rights and contracts is essential to very high rate of economic 
                                                             
28
  Statistical Yearbook of China (Beijing: China Statistical Press, 1982).  
29
  The figures come from various years of the Statistical Yearbook of China, supra note 25. 
30
  Ibid. 
31
 Lipset, supra note 14, pp. 78-79. 
32
  The figures come from various years of the Statistical Yearbook of China, supra note 25. 
33
 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster 
Paperbacks, 1996), p. 78. 
34
  Ibid., p. 78. 
35
  Douglass North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1990), p. 54. 
36
  Douglass North, Structure and Change in Economic History 6 (New York: Norton, 1981) (observing that the “existence 
of a positive return to saving is also dependent upon the structure of property rights.”). 
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development.
37
 Huntington’s explanation that modernization and democracy are different things means 
that the casual link runs from economic development to cultural element. He says specifically that: 
Successful economic development generates self-confidence and assertiveness on the part of those who 
produce it and benefit from it. Wealth, like power, is assumed to be proof of virtue, a demonstration of 
moral and cultural superiority.
38
 
Modernization theory only indicates that broad-based economic development is a necessary condition 
for democracy. Once a political decision is made to democratize the political regime, modernization 
can better sustain democracy. Whether a country in the middle income range moves towards 
democratization depends upon many other factors. The case of China shows that fast rate of economic 
development may even prolong the authoritarian political regime. The confidence produced by fast rate 
of economic development, of course, is only one of the possible factors explaining China’s persistence 
of its authoritarian political regime. As there are other factors supporting the current political regime, I 
will turn to the cultural or ideological explanation in the next Section. 
3 Cultural or Ideological Explanation 
Chinese society was deeply influenced by Confucianism before the establishment of the People’s 
Republic of China. Thereafter, China has been under the ruling of the Communist Party of China 
(CPC). Both Confucianism and communism are conducive to authoritarian regimes.  
Confucianism was developed during later Zhou Dynasty (770 – 221 B. C.). At that time, the Chinese 
society was mainly agricultural in nature. War was very frequent. Education was only available to a 
very small proportion of the population. Naturally, Confucianists emphasized hierarchy. In such a 
hierarchical society, people are divided into four classes.
39
 They are scholars, peasants, artisans, and 
merchants.
40
 This type of classification reveals the emphasis of agriculture and the downgrading of 
merchants.
41
 The classification makes sense when it was relatively easy for rulers to monitor 
agricultural production but difficult to assess the production of commerce as transportation and 
communication was very inefficient and costly. Scholars were limited and they played the role as 
political advisors just as Confucius did.  
                                                             
37
  Guanghua Yu and Hao Zhang, “Adaptive Efficiency and Financial Development in China: The Role of Contracts and 
Contractual Enforcement”, 11 Journal of International Economic Law 459-94 (2008); Guanghua Yu, “Adaptive Efficiency 
and Economic Development in China: The Definition and Enforcement of Property Rights”, 11 Australian Journal of Asian 
Law 82-112 (2009). 
38
  Huntington, Clash of Civilization, supra note 33, p. 104. 
39
  Feng You Lan, Introduction to Chinese Philosophy (Beijing: New World Press, 2004), p. 16. 
40
  Ibid. 
41
  Deemphasizing the goal of wealth can be seen in the “Commentary on the Philosopher of Zeng”, The Great Learning, 
Four Books, translated by James Legge and edited by the translation division of the Publisher (Changsha: Hunan Publishing 
House, 1991), p. 17 and p. 19. 
Conference proceedings, Bergen, Norway, June, 23–26, 2013  
528 
 
In addition to the classification of people into four classes, the relations among various people were 
also defined. They include sovereign and ministers, father and son, husband and wife, brother and sister 
(old and young), and friends.
42
 Among these five relations, three are among family members. While the 
other two are not among family members, they can be considered as family relations. For instance, 
sovereign and ministers can be treated as father and son and friends can be treated as brothers.
43
 The 
hierarchical nature among the five relations is very clear. For instance, the ministers should be 
subordinated to the emperor and the wife should be subordinated to the husband. According to 
Confucius, different people shall play their role according to their position.
44
 If people behave 
according to their position, chaos can be avoided at the family level and wars can be prevented at the 
societal level.  
Confucius acted as a political advisor during his lifetime, persuading different rulers to adopt his ideas 
and conception of the good of society. His intention was to serve the rulers and strengthen their rule. 
Therefore, respect for authority was central within Confucianism. After the death of Confucius, 
Confucian values became the dominant ideology through official endorsement since the Han Dynasty 
(206 B. C. - 23 A.D.).
45
 The institutionalization of Confucian values was carried out through the 
official examination system. This examination system was used to select officials. Those who 
succeeded well on the examination would be guaranteed certain posts according to their examination 
results.
46
 As the content of the examination was strictly based upon books containing Confucian 
values,
47
 public deliberation obviously became restricted as other values were downgraded.  
Many Western scholars have commented the impact of Confucianism on democracy. Lipset observed 
that Confucianism was undemocratic.
48
 Huntington shared the similar view that “Confucianism was 
either undemocratic or antidemocratic.”49 Specifically, Huntington provides that: 
Confucian societies lacked a tradition of rights again the state; to the extent that individual rights did 
exist, they were created by the state. Harmony and cooperation were preferred over disagreement and 
competition. The maintenance of order and respect for hierarchy were central values. The conflict of 
ideas, groups, and parties was viewed as dangerous and illegitimate. Most important, Confucianism 
                                                             
42
  Feng, supra note 39, p. 18. 
43
  Ibid. 
44
  The Great Learning, supra note 41, p. 7. 
45
 Feng You Lan, supra note 39, p. 167; Brooke A. Ackerly, “Is Liberalism The Only Way Toward Democracy? 
Confucianism and Democracy”, 33 Political Theory 547-76 (2005), p. 555. 
46
 Ackerly, ibid.; Feng You Lan, ibid., p. 167 and pp. 255-56. 
47
  “Ji Shi” in Book XVI of The Confucian Analects states that “when right principles prevail in the empire, there will be no 
discussions among the common people”, Four Books, supra note 41, p. 219. 
48
 Lipset, supra note 14, p. 6. 
49
 Huntington, Third Wave, supra note 8, p. 300. 
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merged society and the state and provided no legitimacy for autonomous social institutions to balance 
the state at the national level.
50
 
These two scholars are correct only when Confucianism is used by the ruling regime as the dominant 
ideology. History reveals that democracy did not originate in dynasty China. When Confucian values 
are not used as the dominant ideology, however, societies with the influence of Confucianism do not 
object to the transplantation of democratic political regimes. Taiwan provides a good example of 
relative smooth transplantation of a democratic political regime. Another good example of 
transplantation of democratic political regime is Korea. Empirical evidence suggests that Korea was 
still under the influence of Confucian values at the beginning of this century. The study of Chong-Min 
Park and Doh Chull Shin reveals that the Confucian value of social harmony remains widely 
accepted.
51
 Their survey also indicates that the value of family primacy is still widely accepted by the 
Korean population.
52
 Most Korean people treat the state as a national family.
53
 Despite the influence of 
Confucian values in South Korea, the country has successfully transplanted a democratic political 
regime. Their survey shows that even those who hold Confucian values support democracy.
54
 
In contrast, Ackerly identifies ren (humaneness) as the foundation for Confucian democratic political 
thought in the Confucian tradition.
55
 Confucian democracy, however, lacks empirical support. Despite 
the official endorsement of Confucian values by different dynasties in ancient China, public 
participation for the election of high level officials was never adopted.  Confucian values were 
designed to serve the ruling class or to strengthen their political governance, these values failed to 
emphasize formal constraints on the exercise of power except that rulers should keep ren in their mind 
in guiding their actions. It shall also be pointed out that while Confucianism does not try to exclude 
other ideologies, it does not encourage the ordinary people to join political deliberation. From a 
normative perspective, O’Dwyer has argued that public deliberation in the form of democracy can be 
compatible with the preservation of Confucian tradition.
56
 While his consequential approach is 
consistent with the transplantation of democracy in Korea and Taiwan, O’Dwyer fails to deal with the 
issue that a society like China has also been under communist rule for more than 60 years. 
While communism differs significantly from Confucianism, communism shares the concept of elite 
rule with Confucianism. Leadership and representation of the people by the Communist Party of China 
                                                             
50
 Ibid., pp. 300-301. 
51
  Chong-Min Park and Doh Chull Shin, “Do Asian Values Deter Popular Support for Democracy in South Korea?”, 46 
Asian Survey 341-61 (2006), p. 8. 
52
  Ibid., p. 8. 
53
  Ibid., p. 11. 
54
  Ibid., p. 21. 
55
  Ackerly, supra note 45. 
56
  Shaun O’Dwyer, “Democracy and Confucian Values”, 53 Philosophy East and West 39- 63 (2003). 
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(CPC) are assumed rather than through actual authorization or delegation.
57
 From this perspective, 
public deliberation of important policies is not encouraged and participation of the public in the 
selection of higher level leaders is not adopted. In the eyes of the CPC during its early formative years, 
the destination of the future of communist Chinese society appeared to them to be very clear. All was 
needed was to implement the plan. Those who opposed the communist plan were considered enemies 
of the people and should be suppressed. Under the current CPC regime, such a utopian ideal is no 
longer pursued. This does not mean, however, that the CPC is enthusiastic about the adoption of a 
democratic regime.  
History shows that the abandonment of communist rule has been brought by popular demand. East 
Europe provides a very good example. Two major factors have significantly influenced the popular 
view in East Europe. One is geo-political factor which will be further discussed in the next Section. 
The other is the superior economic performance of the economies of West European countries and the 
United States at that time. While writing in a slightly different context, Huntington’s remarks below are 
quite relevant on how economic superiority may affect regime change or borrowing:  
Increases in hard economic and military power produce enhanced self-confidence, arrogance, and 
belief in the superiority of one’s own culture or soft power compared to those of other peoples and 
greatly increase its attractiveness to other peoples. Decreases in economic and military power lead to 
self-doubt, crises of identity, and efforts to find in other cultures the keys to economic, military, and 
political success.
58
 
More specifically, Huntington says that “In large measure, rise and decline of democracy on a global 
scale is a function of the rise and decline of the most powerful democratic states.”59 
Compared with East Europe, the case of China is different. China’s economic reform was initiated by 
the State and preceded political reform. State led economic development and the early emphasis of FDI 
reduced political pressure on regime change. When the state began to introduce measures for the 
expansion of contractual commercial activities, part of the population both in the rural area and in the 
urban area started to benefit from enhanced living standard. FDI producing labour intensive products 
has also increased employment when China started to show its clear comparative advantage in 
producing labour intensive products in the 1980s and 1990s. Unlike capitalists who are independent 
from the state, foreign invested enterprises did not press for regime change. Gallagher even argued that 
FDI induced competition was identified as domestic versus foreign rather than public versus private, 
insulating the CPC from political charges.
60
 Naturally, the state enjoyed great freedom to carry out 
                                                             
57
  See paragraph one of the General Principles of the Constitution of the Communist Party of China, available at 
http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64156/65682/4475081.html  (accessed June 10, 2012);  paragraph 7 of the Preamble of the 
Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2004-
03/15/content_1367387.htm (accessed June 10, 2012).  
58
  Huntington, Clash of Civilization, supra note 33, p. 92. 
59
  Huntington, supra note 16, p. 206. 
60
  Gallagher, supra note 1, p. 344. 
Conference proceedings, Bergen, Norway, June, 23–26, 2013  
531 
 
economic reform during the early stage. While a small proportion of the population became relatively 
worse off, most people in different sectors enjoyed rising living standard.
61
 Lau and his colleagues have 
similarly argued that welfare improvement of the majority brought by the economic reform reduced the 
threat of political instability.
62
 As economic improvement brought by economic reforms has been 
initiated and controlled by the CPC with a strong socialist legacy,
63
 the political regime to a large 
extent has been accepted by the public so far.  
As has been analyzed, Confucianism is not very conductive to the development of democracy.
64
 
Confucianist societies, however, may transplant democracy if there is a political will as the case of 
Taiwan has demonstrated or Confucian values can be consistent with democracy as the case of South 
Korea has revealed. When Confucianism and communism are combined together, the process of 
democratization will take a longer time. China, North Korea, and Vietnam are three cases supporting 
this point.  
There are limits in resorting to the cultural variable. Huntington has discussed several factors to 
question the cultural obstacle.
65
 First, Catholicism was used to explain the resistance of democracy, but 
Catholicism has become pro-democratic.
66
 Second, cultures are dynamic and are evolving through 
time.
67
 Cultures also interact with other variables such as economic development. Economic 
development promotes diversity. This is so as decentralized innovation and competition on the market 
creates wealth outside governments. Differential wealth ownership results in diversified values and 
preferences. Diversity requires the change of traditionally held values of Confucianism which is based 
on an agricultural society and communist values which emphasizes equality and deference to party 
rule. While diversity moves towards greater degree of public participation as people try to express their 
views if public policies affect people’s interest differently than policies on a homogeneous group of 
population under old regimes, economic development may move in the direction of choosing China’s 
own model of democracy as people’s confidence increases. 
                                                             
61
  For a detailed analysis of welfare change of people in different sectors, see Wright, supra note 3. 
62
  Lawrence Lau, Yingyi Qian, and Gerald Roland, “Reform without Losers: An Interpretation of China’s Dual-Track 
Approach to Transition”, 108 Journal of Political Economy 120- 43 (2000). 
63
  See Wright, supra note 3, p. 2. Also see Sebastian Heilmann and Elizabeth J. Perry eds., Mao’s Invisible Hand 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center: Distributed by the Harvard University Press, 2011). 
64
  For a contrary view that Confucianism is conducive to or at least compatible with modern democracy, see Joseph C.W. 
Chan, “Democracy and Meritocracy: Toward a Confusion Perspective”, 34 Journal of Chinese Philosophy 179- 93 (2007); 
also see Daniel A. Bell, China’s New Confucianism: Politics and Everyday Life in a Changing Society (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2010). 
65
  Huntington, Third Wave, supra note 8, p. 311. 
66
  Ibid. 
67
  Ibid. 
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Just as modernization by itself is not an adequate explanatory variable, so is the cultural explanation. 
The next Section examines the geo-political variable in explaining the persistence of China’s 
authoritarianism. 
4 The Geo-political Variable 
Geo-political factors play important roles in the transplantation of democratic political regimes. One 
mechanism the geo-political factor works to shape the democratization of other nations is the role 
model. Smaller nations or less developed nations tend to learn from and borrow democratic institutions 
from the more advanced core nations they admire. When commenting on the impact of culture on 
regime change, Huntington claims that “if it were not for the changes within the Catholic Church and 
the resulting actions of the Church against authoritarianism, fewer third wave transitions to democracy 
would have occurred and many that did occur would have occurred later.” 68 In addition, he refers to 
the major sources of influence in the world then including the European Community, which specified 
democracy as a precondition to joining the community, the United States, and the Soviet Union in their 
active promotion of democracy in the later 1980s.
69
  
In attributing the receptivity to German and US constitutional review practice to geopolitics in Korea 
and Taiwan, Ginsburg provides: 
Both polities were small and vulnerable, characteristics that can lead to quick adjustments to changing 
international conditions. Both countries (along with postwar West Germany) found themselves as 
United States allies engaged in political-ideological confrontation with Communist regimes that 
claimed to be the legitimate government of their peoples. Their legitimation in these confrontations 
came from identification as embodiments of liberal values against Communism. As such, throughout 
the Cold War period, the United States provided an important “reference society” against which 
progress was measured. America, and to a less extent Germany, was where elites went for training, 
where dissidents went for exile, and was the source of technology, capital, and ideas.
70
 
Scholars in political science or law, however, have not paid adequate attention to the influence of 
geopolitical factors in the process of China’s democratization. In explaining China’s delayed 
democratization, Gallagher compared the case of China with that of Korea and Taiwan. According to 
Gallagher, state-led development in Korea and Taiwan relied very much upon the domestic private 
sector whereas state-led development in China relied heavily upon FDI.
71
 It is the development of the 
private sector in Korea and Taiwan which led to political change and eventual democratization.
72
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Development of the private sector by itself, however, is not adequate for regime change. Gallagher’s 
focus is too narrow. She not only ignores the cultural factor but also the geo-political variable.  
 Geo-political factors may, however, also operate to resist learning from other nations. It is the 
author’s argument that political hostility between the US and China from 1940s to 1970s and lack of 
political trust during the beginning of this century are a contributing factor of China’s delayed process 
of democratization. This relation works through the mechanism of nationalism. In addition, wars or 
hostility reduces people’s rationality in assessing alternatives. Right after the founding of the People 
Republic of China (China) in 1949, US and China respectively and in sequence joined the Korea War
73
 
which resulted in the death of hundreds of thousands of soldiers on both sides. In addition, US and 
China were also involved in the Vietnam War.
74
 In contrast to the Korea War in which soldiers of 
China and soldiers of the United Nations led by the US fought directly, China’s involvement in the 
Vietnam War was much more indirect. Unlike the Korea War, however, the Vietnam War lasted much 
longer. Both wars caused a great deal of hostility between China and US. Fighting wars to protect the 
nation requires a strong government. The Chinese government’s partial success in these wars enhanced 
the regime’s legitimacy among the public at large. When nations are at war or engaged in political 
hostility, transplantation of foreign regimes such as democracy becomes much harder.  
Political liberalism in the former Soviet Union occurred at the end of 1980s when the hostility between 
the US and the Soviet Union was considerably reduced. The reduction of hostility between the US and 
the Soviet Union can also explain the process of democratization in East Europe. Despite the pulling 
factor of the European Community which enjoyed a much higher living standard, East Europe’s 
process of democratization was not promising due to the intervention of the Soviet Union. Only when 
the Soviet Union itself decided to liberalize its political system and shifted its policy to non-
intervention, did the East European countries begin to carry out measures of liberalization. From this 
perspective, the non-intervention policy of the Soviet Union can be considered as the pushing factor in 
the process of democratization of the East European countries. Furthermore, the European Community 
was much less hostile towards East European nations than the hostility imposed by the US on North 
Korea, Vietnam, and China. 
An additional case to explain my argument is Cuba. Cuba is a very small nation. It is closely located to 
the US in terms of geography. From an economic perspective, the gains to be realized from its trade 
with the US are enormous. In addition to trade, potential FDI from US is likely to significantly benefit 
Cuba. Unlike the East European countries, there was not much external constraint on Cuba’s 
autonomous decisions on its choice of political regime. Neither the Soviet Union nor China was likely 
or able to intervene had Cuba decided to move towards a democratic political regime in 1980s or 
1990s. All these tend to suggest that Cuba would become democratized ahead of the East European 
countries. This did not occur. A likely explanation is the hostility between the US and Cuba. Ever since 
the establishment of the socialist regime in Cuba, the hostility of the US towards Cuba’s political 
system has been high. Under political hostility, the US imposed various types of economic sanctions on 
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Cuba at different times. The US also planned several unsuccessful attempts to overthrow the 
government of Cuba. Despite the hostility and economic sanctions, Cuba remains so far an 
authoritarian regime. 
Further to the hostility, the US also acted in different ways which promote nationalism in China. 
Despite the normalization of China-US relations in 1979, the US has kept its policy of selling weapons 
to Taiwan. Although the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979
75
 promised to make available such defense 
weapons as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability, 
pursuant to the 1982 Shanghai Communique, the United States would not sell Taiwan a greater number 
of weapons than it did before 1979 and it intended to reduce its sales of arms to Taiwan.
76
 Despite its 
promise, the Bush Administration authorized the sale of 150 F-16 fighters to Taiwan in 1992.
77
 More 
recently in 2010, the Obama Administration initiated the sale of USD 6 billion worth of Patriot anti-
missile systems, helicopters, mine-sweeping ships and communications equipment to Taiwan.
78
 In 
September 2011, the Obama Administration again announced a package of USD 5.85 billion to 
refurnish and upgrade Taiwan’s fleet of F-16 fighters.79 To the majority of Chinese people, such 
actions constituted interference with China’s domestic affairs.  
The recent position of the US on the disputes over the South China Sea between China and the 
Philippines or Vietnam also tends to strengthen nationalism in China. China has persistently claimed 
and maintained sovereignty over the Nansha Islands (the Spratly Islands) and the Xisha Islands (the 
Paracel Islands) “by ways of discovery, naming, mapping, control, public and private use, 
administrative allocation of jurisdiction, and other manifestations of authority throughout history”.80 
Before France occupied some of the islands in the South China Sea in the 1930s, no other nation made 
sovereignty claims to the islands in the South China Sea.
81
 In 1938, Japan also recognized China’s 
sovereignty over the South China Sea Islands, perhaps for a selfish purpose.
82
 During the Second 
World War, however, Japan replaced France and illegally took over the entire chain of islands in the 
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South China Sea.
83
 After Japan’s defeat, it renounced its claim to the South China Sea Islands.84 
According to the Cairo Declaration made in 1943, China, the United Kingdom and the United States 
announced that all territories Japan had illegally taken from China should be restored to China, 
including the South China Sea Islands put by Japan under then Taiwan’s jurisdiction.85 The Cairo 
Declaration was reconfirmed by the Potsdam Proclamation in 1945. 
86
 At the San Francisco Peace 
Conference in 1951, both France and Vietnam represented at the conference made their claims to the 
South China Sea Islands, but their “claims were ignored at the conference in particular and by the 
international community in general.”87 Although China did not attend the conference, Premier Zhou 
Enlai issued a statement reiterating China’s sovereignty over the South China Sea Islands.88 The Soviet 
representative appealed to recognize China’s sovereignty over Taiwan, the Xisha Islands and the 
Nanshatsuntao Islands including the Spratly chain.
89
  
The Philippines only started to claim its sovereignty over some of the Nansha Islands in 1956 and 
South Vietnam started to encroach upon some of the Xisha Islands in 1959.
90
 These and many other 
claims were repeatedly rejected by the Chinese Government either by official statement and declaration 
or by war.
91
 Due to the rich natural resources, the disputes between China and other nations, such as the 
Philippines or Vietnam, have recently been intensified.
92
 Despite the clear history of which the US is 
well aware, the US appears to side with the Philippines and Vietnam regardless of China’s concern and 
interest. While the dispute between China and Vietnam over Nasha Islands and Xisha Islands is 
continuing, the Roger Revelle, a US Navy research vessel, visited Tien Sa Port in Vietnam on June 22, 
2012.
93
  With respect to the dispute between China and the Philippines over the Scarborough Shoal, the 
US also explicitly sided with the Philippines by its intention to increase its military assistance to the 
Philippines.
94
 This raises the issue why the US tries to reduce the influence of China in Asia. One of 
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the major political reasons is that the US is not willing to accept China’s leadership or dominance in 
Asia.
95
 Professor Huntington, a well-known and influential political scientist in the 1990s explains:
96
 
For over two hundred years the United States has attempted to prevent the emergence of an 
overwhelmingly dominant power in Europe. For almost a hundred years, beginning with its “Open 
Door” policy toward China, it has attempted to do the same in East Asia. 
Under such a political mentality, the US recently announced its policy of returning to Asia. While it 
may not try to establish military bases in countries surrounding China, it does have the intention of 
using the military bases of countries such as the Philippines and Vietnam for short term purposes when 
the need arises.
97
  
Obviously, the popular view in China is that the US does not want to have a united or coherent Asia 
with China playing a relatively important role. Most people in China also do not understand why US is 
stepping up its efforts to curtail China politically and militarily when China is not only the US’s largest 
trading partner in Asia but also the US’s largest governmental bond holder. To many Chinese people, 
the US’ attitudes toward China’s peaceful emergence and development are puzzling. This may also 
explain why most elites in contemporary China tend to go with the Chinese government on reform 
policies. 
A potential counterargument is that the process of democratization is entirely a domestic matter. 
Whether a country decides to adopt a democratic regime or an authoritarian regime should be a matter 
for its own people. This counterargument is normatively correct, but positively inaccurate. If core 
nations can exert influence upon other smaller nations or less developed nations on their choice of 
political systems, the actions of core nations can also function in ways affecting the delay of 
democratization of smaller nations or less developed nations. The geo-political factor of the US does 
affect nationalism in China in a subtle way. Further empirical studies can shed better light on this point. 
As nationalism reduces or resists foreign influence, the geo-political factor of the role of the US does 
negatively affect the public opinions or perception of introducing liberal political regimes from the US. 
To generalize at a lower level of abstraction, US hostility prolongs authoritarianism in North Korea, 
China, Vietnam, and Cuba. It has to be pointed out that China as a core nation has also exerted some 
negative influence upon North Korea and Vietnam on their delayed democratization. 
Geo-political factors also affect cultural elements. When nations are at war or engaged in hostility, the 
cultural identity issue becomes a serious concern. This is one of the main causes that the US has had 
great difficulty establishing peace and order during the Iraq War and the War in Afghanistan, not to 
mention setting up a stable democracy in these two countries. Otherwise, there would be popular 
support of the US efforts in building a new regime when the old authoritarian regime has been 
overthrown in these two countries. 
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If there is anything to be derived from the positive to the normative, two points need to be emphasized. 
The first point to be generalized from this discussion of the geo-political factor is that nations are able 
to shape the political system of others or learn from each other easier or better under friendly or 
peaceful conditions. Why the Chinese political system is more democratic now than it was under Mao’s 
rule is the better relations between China and the US and Europe. Obviously, the significant trading and 
investment relationship China is enjoying with the West is vital to China’s ever improving political 
regime. If we believe that China’s political regime will become more democratic regardless from the 
substantive point of view or from the procedural point of view there is no need to expect that China 
will quickly adopt any Western style of democracy in the short term. 
An even more important point I want to emphasize is that nations should adopt certain soft version of 
cosmopolitanism. If we do not divide clearly between us and them, mutual learning will become easier. 
With the development of transportation and communication, the free flow of people and information 
tends to make nations adjust their system according to changing circumstances.  History is replete with 
examples of terrible consequences because of the sharp division along ideological lines among nations. 
The pursuit of communism in the former socialist countries led to the persecution or the deterioration 
of human rights conditions of millions of people in these countries. The division resulting from the 
Cold War has also caused a tremendous welfare loss to this world. If we do not pay attention to the 
methods of pushing western style of democracy, the outcome may not be as good as we desire or 
expect.  Pursuing any type of ideology to the extreme may result in the treatment of human beings as 
means rather than ends. Cosmopolitan views based humanity is more likely to solve problems among 
or within nations.  
5 Resilience or Legitimacy 
A residual category on the persistence of China’s authoritarianism focuses on resilience. There are two 
basic approaches. One deals mainly with the process or institutional change of China’s political regime. 
The other analyzes resilience from the standpoint of outcome or welfare. 
Nathan’s study, for instance, examines four aspects of CPC’s institutional change. These aspects 
include: “1) the increasingly norm-based nature of its succession politics; 2) the increase in meritocratic 
as opposed to factional considerations in the promotion of political elites; 3) the differentiation and 
functional specialization of institutions within the regime, and 4) the establishment of institutions for 
political participation and appeal that strengthen the CPC’s legitimacy among the public at large.”98 
Norm-bound succession convention makes orderly transfer of power possible. More specifically, term 
and age limit increases regime legitimacy. Meritocratic considerations in the promotion of political 
leaders reduce factional fighting and increases regime performance. The differentiation and functional 
specialization of institutions within the regime increases specialization and professionalization. 
Political participation at the local level
99
 and intellectuals’ advisory input at the policy formulation 
level increase regime support. Yan’s research as explained in the Introduction section is also based on 
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process or institutional change.
100
 Local people’s consultative conference’s efforts have consolidated 
the political support of the regime.  
The outcome or welfare based approach, on the other hand, analyzes the outcome or welfare impact of 
regime reform. Lau and his colleagues
101
 for instance, argue that China’s dual track102 approach to 
structural reform of the economy for transition is Pareto efficient. This is so as the newly created 
system of market allocation of resources provided new opportunities or benefits to new comers while 
the existing state planning system implicitly compensated potential losers under the old regime. 
According to Lau and his colleagues, Pareto-improving reform reduced political resistance of 
reform.
103
 Although their research does not explicitly use the term resilience, the effect of their research 
is close to the category of resilience. An implication from their research is that Pareto-improving 
reforms attract political support. Wright offers another outcome or welfare-based approach to 
resilience.
104
 While Wright’s approach is also process-oriented, she has focused, to some extent, on the 
welfare effects of various types of people in China, explaining that factors of change have improved the 
welfare of people in most social-economic sectors.
105
 
Resilience, however, is not an independent variable. It covers and interacts with other different 
variables. For instance, process oriented approach actually touches upon the variable of legitimacy. 
Regimes enjoying high legitimacy are relatively stable. Political reform in China related to age and 
term limit of office increases legitimacy as entrenchment of non-performing or corrupted leaders 
becomes more difficult. This factor, together with meritocratic promotion and functional specialization, 
improves legitimacy through regime performance and reduction of politics. Expansion of individual 
input and participation in public governance enhances legitimacy through the perception of populism. 
Outcome or welfare based approach not only focuses on performance legitimacy but also is related to 
modernization. Other things being equal, performance enhances legitimacy. From this perspective, the 
study of Lau and his colleagues and the research of Wright can be used to explain the persistence of 
China’s authoritarianism on the ground that reform improves legitimacy. In addition to the variable of 
legitimacy, outcome or welfare based theories overlaps with the variable of modernization. While 
traditional modernization theory emphasizes the correlation between economic development and the 
likelihood of democratization, the theory also leaves room that economic development will not 
necessarily lead to political democratization. The case of China provides evidence that economic 
development or welfare improvement of the general population strengthens China’s authoritarianism 
instead through the enhancement of regime legitimacy and confidence in building its own system. 
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6 Review of Survey Results 
Democracy is supported by values such as popular sovereignty, commitment to the equality of citizens, 
and the principle of majority-decision making with adequate protection of minority rights. From this 
perspective, popular views on their right and intention to participate in the deliberation and formation 
of public policies and the election of higher level political leaders are of vital importance. If this is the 
case, popular views or perception on the role of government or the ruling party in China provides an 
indication of people’s demand of democracy. In China, the ruling party and its government have 
exerted a great deal of control over the selection of higher level governmental leaders, the media, and 
the establishment of non-profit organizations. If demand of democracy is high, people’s perception of 
the role of government over their lives should be very high. The research of Nathan and Shi reveals, 
however, that approximately 72 percent of Chinese citizens consider the role of national and local 
governments insignificant in their daily lives.
106
 Such a public perception is an indication of lack of 
popular demand of Western democracy in China. 
To counter tyranny of the majority, democratic regimes require the constitutional protection of 
fundamental rights of minorities and the conception of equality of citizens. If citizens are truly treated 
as equal moral concerns, freedom of expression is important. Freedom of expression, of course, does 
not mean that the view of each person will be adopted on every occasion. Strauss says: “Where there is 
a great deal of agreement within our society, and our own legal culture, on certain matters, there is also 
a great deal of disagreement.”107 He specifically provides: 
One thing we do, then, when we accept a legal system, is in effect to say to our fellow citizens that we 
are not going to insist on having everything our own way. More precisely, we are saying that we 
recognize that there is intense disagreement about certain moral matters; that if society is to function, 
some of those matters must be authoritatively resolved, and everyone must live with the resolution; and 
that we understand that the institutions we establish to resolve these disagreements might sometimes 
reach the result we do not favor. In any large and heterogeneous society – that is, a society that must 
confront different issues, and in which there are many different views, - nearly everyone will lose 
occasionally.
108
 
While certain individuals’ view may not be adopted on every occasion, they are entitled to express their 
views. Without free expression of views, relevant institutions are not able to know the preferences of 
society in the formulation of political decisions. In addition to this instrumental goal, freedom of 
expression is closely related to permanent human development.
109
 Individuals may also have moral 
rights again the government (the majority).
110
 To protect the fundamental rights of individuals, the 
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constitution of democratic regimes contains bills of rights. The operation of such democratic regimes 
requires tolerance of different views of individuals in society. The research of Nathan and Shi, 
however, shows that “few than 20 percent of the Chinese respondents were willing to allow 
sympathizers of a deviant viewpoint to express their views in a meeting as compared to 40 to 75 
percent of the populations in the other countries in their studies.”111 Lack of tolerance is conducive to 
authoritarianism.  
Lewis-Back and Stegmaier’s study reveals that retrospective evaluation of economic or fiscal 
conditions plays an important role in the political fate of elected officials all over the world.
112
 Studies 
in China also indicate that economic performance and promotion of provincial leaders are closely 
correlated.
113
 Revenue maximization, however, is not normally related to the election of political 
leaders in democratic regimes. Gao’s study suggests, however, that at the county level in China, a 10 
percent increase in revenue growth would increase the odds of being locally promoted in the following 
year by five percent.
114
 He thereby challenges the perception that “the party is on a slippery slope of 
decay and disintegration.”115 
The above empirical studies show that the authoritarian regime in China is still considerably safe. This 
goes to the issue whether popular support of the current regime can be attributed to the variables 
analyzed in this article. Unfortunately, nobody has a survey design which is close or similar to the 
variables examined in this article. All I can do is to draw some empirical support to some of the 
variables whenever there is clear evidence. 
Wright has reviewed several popular surveys and come to the conclusion that “recent survey data 
indicate substantial popular support for the authoritarian ruling regime and weak interest in liberal 
democratic principles.”116 While she attributes the result to state-led economic development, market 
forces related to late industrialization, and socialist legacy, the factor of culture is certainly relevant in 
shaping the popular perception in China. As the socialist regime in China has its own conception of 
democracy, the public considers the current regime somewhat democratic. A popular survey conducted 
by Shi in 2002 reveals that over 60 percent of respondents described the current system as democratic 
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in certain way.
117
 On a subtle issue of the official view of socialist democracy and Western concept of 
democracy, a slightly more people share the official version of democracy.
118
 
Similar to other East Asian nations or regions, most people in China consider economic development 
more important than democracy.
119
 People’s view on economic development goes to the variables of 
legitimacy and modernization. With respect to legitimacy, Party and state-led economic development 
has clear positive impact on legitimacy. On the issue of society and economy, 96.6 percent expressed 
the view that the economy today is better than in 1979.
120
 
With respect to the variable of legitimacy through process or institutional change, there is significant 
positive perception among the public. On the point of regime change from 1970s to 1990s then to the 
beginning of this century, “over 80 percent of respondents perceived a change in the democratic 
direction.”121 With respect to future change, the Chinese are equally or more positive than people in 
other East Asian nations or regions.
122
 More specifically, Shi’s survey shows that people found 
considerable improvement in freedom of expression.
123
  
As for the position whether China’s economic development will lead to democracy, the survey shows 
positive response but not along the line of Western concept of democracy. Shi’s survey indicates that 
the “Chinese are overwhelmingly supportive of democracy.”124 Furthermore, urban residents are more 
supportive of democracy than rural residents.
125
 The Chinese concept of democracy is, however, more 
closely related to populism.
126
 While there is a considerable support (84 percent) of having elections of 
national leaders, only 16.3 percent agreed or strongly agreed with multiparty competition.
127
 That result 
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indicates that China is likely to have a different type of democracy. Peerenboom may be right that 
China is likely to adopt a soft authoritarian or communitarian type of democracy.
128
  
7 Conclusion 
This article has examined the persistence of China’s authoritarianism in terms of lack of multiparty 
competition for the election of high level executive or legislative leaders. While recognizing the 
contribution and coherence of single variable explanation of various scholars, I prefer a multivariable 
approach to the analysis of the issue on explaining China’s lack of a western style of democracy. The 
multivariable approach with a focus on China is obviously not new as several researchers have already 
done work in this area. My contribution is to focus on different variables explaining the persistence of 
China’s authoritarianism to which others have not adequately paid attention. These explanations 
include the modernization theory, the cultural variable, the geo-political factor of the US’ role in 
China’s democratization process, and legitimacy. Although the process of democratization in China is 
very slow, the dynamics of forces and particularly the pursuit of individual rights in contemporary 
China will gradually lead to political changes in China. Given the very successful economic 
development and China’s experience of gradual reform of its institutions during the past 30 years, a 
likely process is towards political transparency and accountability first under the one party rule in the 
short run and gradually towards the liberalization of people’s freedom of expression and freedom of the 
media.  Freedom of expression and freedom of the media is democracy as public reason. Democracy as 
public reason is conducive to the establishment of external monitoring mechanisms to make sure that 
political leaders have to work for the best interest of the larger society. While Western style of 
democracy may not likely to be adopted in China in the near future, democracy in terms of public 
reason and as an external monitoring mechanism over political leaders will develop nevertheless. If that 
is the case, the means and methods of moving towards a future democratic society have to be dealt 
with. I will leave that task elsewhere. 
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